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Policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Medicaid Health 
Insurance Program in the US have targeted low-income families with children as priority 
recipients of government assistance. In Canada, the Canada Child Tax Benefit and the 
National Child Benefit (NCB) have similarly been designed to provide assistance 
primarily for families with children. Along with the goal of providing assistance to these 
families, both the EITC and the NCB have also been designed to encourage families to 
participate in the labour force, with the long-term objective of helping these families 
provide for themselves. 
Given the explicit objective of the EITC to help promote labour force 
participation, much of the economics literature on the EITC has examined its labour 
market effects. Because the EITC is a federal program, these studies have tended to rely 
on variation in the program over time (Eissa and Liebman, 1996, Meyer and Rosenbaum, 
2001), or on variation within the program across families (Eissa and Hoynes, 1998, 
Dickert, Houser and Scholz, 1995).  Hotz and Scholz (2003) summarize the findings from 
these and other studies and draw the following broad conclusions: the EITC positively 
affects labour force participation of single-parent households and these effects are 
substantial. The EITC has a modest negative effect on labour force participation for 
secondary workers in two-parent families. Finally the EITC has a negative effect on 
hours worked for those already in the labour force, although the negative hours effect, in 
the aggregate, is smaller than the participation effect. 
Research on European working tax credits is more limited.  In the United 
Kingdom, Bingley and Walker (1997) find that the Family Credit increased part-time 
work, while Blundell et al. (2000) simulate the effects of the Working Family Tax Credit, 
  1uncovering positive work effects for single mothers but negative effects for married 
women.  Several other European countries have, or have plans, to introduce similar 
measures.  Immervoll et al. (2004) describe the pan-European landscape and simulate the 
effects of in-work versus universal benefits, concluding that universal benefits are only 
preferred if the government has a very large taste for redistribution. 
  We examine the labour market effects of the National Child Benefit program in 
Canada.  The unique feature of the NCB relative to policies in other countries is its 
integration with social assistance (welfare) payments.  Provinces agreed to subtract the 
federally-paid National Child Benefit Supplement benefits from provincially-paid social 
assistance payments.  This structure allowed former welfare recipients to carry part of 
their social assistance payments with them into the work force, effectively lowering the 
welfare wall.  Because certain provinces chose to not deduct the new federal benefit from 
recipients’ social assistance cheques, we have a large and transparent source of 
identifying variation on which to base our estimates.  In addition to the integration of 
benefits, several provinces also introduced small earned income supplements as part of 
the National Child Benefit program.  Using this variation, we are able to compare the 
relative efficacy of these two methods of improving labour market incentives. 
We calculate the federal and provincial benefits available to each family in our 
survey using a detailed tax and benefit simulator for the Canadian tax system.  This 
allows us to directly estimate the marginal effects of changes in the NCB on labour force 
participation, social assistance receipt, hours worked, total earnings, and social assistance 
dollars.  The continuity of the measures available offers an improvement over an 
approach that simply compares outcomes across discrete test and control groups. 
  2  Our findings suggest that there were strong labour market effects from the 
integration of child benefits with welfare for single mothers. An additional $1,000 in 
benefits deducted from social assistance payments is associated with a six percentage 
point decrease in social assistance take-up, and a 3.9 percentage point increase in having 
worked.  Evidence for earnings and weeks of work on the intensive margin is much 
weaker, with no strong evidence of a response.  Both of these findings are consistent with 
theory and the previous literature. Further, we find little effect of the provincial earned 
income benefit programs on work incentives.  We speculate that this may be related to 
the relative visibility of social assistance integration versus the earned income benefits. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the National Child 
Benefit Program in detail. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy; section 4 describes 
the data sets and tax information used in our analyses. Sections 5 and 6 present our 
results, and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The National Child Benefit Program 
The National Child Benefit (NCB) program was introduced in July, 1998 as a 
component of the Canada Child Tax Benefit.  The NCB encompasses two programs, a 
federally-provided refundable tax-credit (called the National Child Benefit Supplement – 
NCB Supplement) and provincially-provided initiatives.  The stated goals of the program 
were to reduce child poverty, promote attachment to the labour force, and reduce overlap 
between federal and provincial initiatives (Department of Finance 1997). 
The benefit level for each family is determined by family income and the number 
of children.  Benefits are paid quarterly starting in July.  The family income used to 
  3determine benefits comes from amounts reported on the tax filing of the previous 
calendar year, so the benefits starting in July of 1999 used income from the 1998 calendar 
year.  Families must apply to receive benefits; applications are typically included with 
birth registration and other government documents at the hospital when the child is born. 
The annual benefit amount in 1998 was $605 for the first child, $405 for the 
second, and $330 for the third and additional children.  The benefits are reduced with 
family income, starting at a threshold of $20,921 (for 1998).
1  The clawback rates were 
set such that the benefit would be reduced to zero when income reached $25,921 for all 
family sizes.
2  Figure 1 traces out the benefits as a function of family income.   
Importantly for our empirical strategy, the incentive to work (so long as income is less 
than $25,921) differs sharply by the number of children.  In 2002-03, the federal 
government spent $7.8 billion on the Canada Child Tax Benefit.  This amount 
represented a real increase of 32 percent over the amount spent in 1997-1998.
3  Most of 
this increase was a result of the introduction and subsequent expansions of the NCB 
Supplement. 
At a province’s discretion, the NCB Supplement benefits could be integrated with 
provincial social assistance programs by deducting the NCB Supplement from social 
assistance payments dollar for dollar.  The provinces, in return, were to use the funds 
saved from the social assistance payments to provide spending programs to assist low 
income families and for provincial income supplements.  Three provinces 
                                                 
1 We refer to the reduction of the benefit with increasing family income as a clawback.  Somewhat 
confusingly, the reduction of social assistance resulting from the integration of benefits under the NCB is 
also often referred to as a ‘clawback’ in Canadian policy discussions.  To maintain clarity, we use 
‘clawback’ only to refer to the reduction of benefits with family income.  When referring to the reduction 
of social assistance, we refer to ‘integration’ and the ‘crowding out’ of social assistance benefits. 
2 The clawback rates in 1998 were 12.1% for one child, 20.2 % for two children, and 26.8% for three 
children. 
3 Dollar amounts taken from the Public Accounts of Canada (Receiver General of Canada 2003). 
  4(Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Quebec) chose to not implement the integration of 
social assistance benefits, meaning that the incentive to work (described in detail below) 
did not exist in these provinces.
4  Moreover, British Columbia’s integrated Family Bonus 
program was introduced in 1996 and had a similar structure.  We use all of this across-
province through-time variation in our estimation of the effect of integration. 
The Quebec and British Columbia cases require more clarification.  The Quebec 
government reduces the level of Quebec Family Allowance for each dollar of federal 
benefits.  In British Columbia, the Family Bonus has also been adjusted by the provincial 
government each time the federal NCB Supplement has changed.  These adjustments 
mean that increases in the federal benefit leave the family no better off, but re-allocate the 
cost of the total benefit between levels of government.  These changes in who pays the 
benefits, however, are not relevant for our study of the integration of the NCB 
supplement with social assistance.  We are concerned with the incentive to leave social 
assistance.  For our purposes, it matters not whether the benefits come from the federal or 
the provincial government, but only whether the family’s social assistance payment is 
reduced to account for the NCB supplement.  In British Columbia, the reduction is made 
while in Quebec it is not.  For this reason, we classify Quebec as a no-integration 
province and British Columbia as an integration province. 
The integration of social assistance benefits under the NCB produces a strong 
incentive to join the labour market.
5  Figure 2 presents a static labour supply model with a 
stylized social assistance benefit.  With no work, an individual receives social assistance 
in the amount of AB.  Between B and C, extra work results in a dollar-for-dollar decrease 
                                                 
4 Since 2001, Manitoba has stopped integrating NCB and social assistance for families that have children 
under age 7.  Our data only cover until 2000, so we ignore this in our analysis. 
5 Hotz and Scholz (2003) provide a thorough treatment of the static labour supply incentives in the EITC. 
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wall.  At C, the social assistance benefit is exhausted and earnings lead to increased 
consumption until point D.  The standard result is represented by points X0 and B.  In the 
absence of social assistance, someone with the preferences embodied in the utility curves 
in the figure would prefer to be at point X0.  With social assistance, point B is preferred, 
however, and the individual chooses no work. 
The line segments EFG represent the change in incentives introduced by the 
integration of social assistance benefits under the NCB program.  Because the 100 
percent tax rate now ends earlier at point E, the individual keeps more of his or her 
earnings for work between points E and G.  This may lead the individual to prefer a point 
such as X1 instead of point B, meaning that the individual would join the labour force. 
Figure 2 also makes the ambiguous predictions of the model for those who were 
already in the labour market when the benefit was introduced.  For some of them, the 
parallel shift of the budget constraint out to EF delivers a work-reducing income effect.  
For those on the FG segment, both the income and the substitution effects lead to less 
work.  Finally, for those operating to the left of point G, there is no change in incentives 
as the benefit is zero because of their high income. 
Provincially-provided initiatives comprise the second part of the National Child 
Benefit program.  The initiatives included both non-cash spending programs and 
provincial tax credit programs.  The non-cash spending programs provided funding for 
such projects as child-care subsidies and health promotion programs, while the tax credits 
took the form of straight transfers or earned income credits.  The provincial credits also 
affect and provide variation in incentives to work.  For example, Ontario provides a Child 
Care Supplement for Working Families.  In 2000, families must have at least $5,000 of 
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of seven) if the family is a single parent family.  Benefits are then clawed back starting at 
$20,000 of family income.  The details of the provincial child credits for all provinces are 
provided in an Appendix. 
While much of our analysis focuses on the NCB Supplement, we do incorporate 
the provincial programs into our analysis as they also provide work incentives to mothers. 
Our analysis therefore allows us to compare the NCB Supplement integration with social 
assistance to the more EITC-like provincial programs. As these programs differ in both 
size and method of delivery, contrasting the two may provide some insight into the 
relative efficacy of each program structure.    
  In addition to the earned income benefits, several provinces and the federal 
government provide a basic level of child benefits that are not tied to employment 
earnings.  These benefits are expected to diminish the incentive to work by extending the 
distance between A and B in Figure 2.  With more income at zero hours of work, less 
work will be observed. We incorporate these ‘automatic’ benefits into our analysis and 
account for their impact in developing our empirical strategy below. 
  In total, the NCB program provides clear incentives to join the work force for 
families currently on social assistance by partially replacing social assistance with a 
benefit that, on net, is only received if working.  In addition, the provincially-run earned 
income supplements provide more incentive to join the labour force.  However, in both 
cases, the prediction for work on the intensive margin is unclear – those already working 
may face higher marginal tax rates on their labour so they may choose to work less. 
  
  73. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy aims for transparent identification of the effects of the 
NCB Supplement on female labour supply decisions.  An alternative strategy might 
incorporate the kinks and twists in the budget constraint generated by child benefit 
policies into a structural model of behaviour.  While there are advantages to either 
approach, we believe that our method is fruitful for answering a relatively direct policy 
question about a small change in benefit incentives within the existing system. 
To test if child benefits have affected labour supply decisions, we run regressions 
of the type 
pyki k y p pyki pyki pyki e kids year prov X Benefit Y + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β , 
where p indexes provinces, y indexes years, k indexes number of children, and i indexes 
families.  We observe labour supply outcomes Ypyki for each family and regress them on 
that family’s observed benefits Benefitpyki, a set of province dummies provp, a set of year 
dummies yeary, a set of dummies for the number of children kidsk, and a vector of other 
relevant controls Xpyki, leaving a residual term epyki. 
The vector Xpyki contains demographic controls about the family as well as 2
nd 
order interaction terms between the province, year, and children dummies.  In this 
standard triple-difference specification, identification of the policy effect comes from 
variation within province-year cells; between families of different sizes.  In other words, 
the policy effect is measured by comparing, for example, women in Ontario in 1997 with 
no kids to those with other numbers of children in the same province in the same year.  
This strategy is therefore robust to any shock that may differentially affect provincial 
labour markets and is correlated with the policy variable. 
  8Specifically, provincial spending programs under the NCB typically do not 
discriminate based on the number of children in the family.  Since our strategy compares 
women with different numbers of children within provinces, the NCB non-cash spending 
programs shouldn’t affect our estimates.  Similarly, if there are other labour market 
policies we do not consider in our empirical model that vary at the province-year level, 
our estimates will not be affected so long as the excluded policy affects everyone in a 
given province in a given year in the same way.  
A key assumption underlying this approach is the exogeneity of the province of 
residence, year, and number of children.  For the province, this assumption would be 
violated if individuals switched provinces in order to benefit from different incentive 
structures.  We consider this possibility unlikely, as the benefits are unlikely to surpass 
the costs of moving.  The number of children may also be influenced by benefits.   
Assuming that children are exogenous to benefits is standard in the EITC literature in the 
US (see Hotz and Scholz 2003), but the assumption may be violated if fertility decisions 
depend on fiscal incentives.  Milligan (2002) found strong evidence that fertility did 
respond to fiscal incentives in Quebec’s Allowance for Newborn Children program in the 
late 80s and early 90s, but found much less evidence of a response among women more 
likely to be at-risk for being on welfare. 
We pursue two strategies to overcome this challenge.  First, we present our results 
using only the province-year variation in the benefits, finding results consistent with 
those that also incorporate the variation induced by the number of children.  Second, we 
also present results excluding children under age 6.  Since the NCB program was 
introduced in 1998 and our data run only until 2000, the decision to have the older 
  9children clearly preceded the introduction of the program and therefore could not have 
been influenced by its incentives. 
 
Endogeneity of benefits 
 
  The observed benefit depends on the province, year, number of children, and 
income of the family.  Importantly, family income is determined by many of the 
outcomes we intend to study as regressands, such as earnings, hours, and weeks worked. 
This introduces a mechanical endogeneity between observed benefits and the measures of 
labour supply. 
  To overcome the endogeneity problem, we implement an instrumental variables 
strategy similar to one pioneered by Currie and Gruber (1996).  The essence of the 
strategy is to form an instrument that simulates benefits using only the exogenous 
determinants of benefits.  As no particular family’s income influences the simulated 
benefit, the mechanical endogeneity is purged. 
  In our case, we assume that the province of residence, year, and number of 
children are exogenous components.  To form our instrument, we take a sample of 
families and calculate the benefits for each province-year-number of children 
combination.  The simulation sample is a 10 percent random sample of the families in our 
five years of SLID data.  As we have 5 years of data, 10 provinces, and 4 family sizes (0 
to 3 children), this means that we must perform 200 benefit simulations for each family in 
the simulation sample.  Importantly, the same set of families is put through the benefit 
calculator for each province-year-children combination, meaning that the benefits 
calculated in each cell do not embody differences in income or other characteristics 
across cells.  The mean benefit over the simulation sample of families in each cell is then 
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as the instrument.  It can be expected to predict well each family’s benefit, but will not 
depend on a particular family’s observed labour market outcomes.  The process is 
repeated over province-year cells to form our province-year simulated instrument. 
  Some of our dependent variables are binary, so our estimation uses a linear 
probability model.  Blundell and Powell (2004) compare a semi-parametric control 
function approach to linear probability and probit results, finding the parametric models 
estimate a slope that is too steep.  Their method requires a parsimonious set of covariates 
in order to be tractable, so it is not appropriate for our policy framework which requires a 
large set of controls to isolate the policy effect.  However, their findings may suggest 
some caution in the interpretation of our results. 
 
4. Data 
We use the Census Family and Person files of the Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics (SLID) for the years 1996 to 2000.  The SLID is conducted annually by 
Statistics Canada with a stratified random sampling of Canadians.  With survey weights, 
the data are potentially nationally representative.  There is evidence, however, that the 
SLID has under-sampling of low income families.
6  While this does not imperil our 
empirical strategy, it might limit the degree to which our results are nationally 
representative.  The SLID provides detailed information on demographics, income and 
labour market activity at the individual level, as well as information on the family size 
and structure at the family level.  The sample size per year is around 35 thousand census 
                                                 
6 Frenette, Green, and Picot (2004) show that low income families are under-represented in the SLID 
relative to administrative tax data and to Census data.  While the weights correct for under-sampling by 
age, province, and sex, the weights are not adjusted for under-coverage by income group. 
  11families made up of 60 thousand individuals aged 15 and higher.  We select our sample 
based on the person files, merging in family characteristics from the family files.  The 
focus of our analysis is mothers with children, so we keep females age 18 to 50.
7  Single 
women face a different employment decision than married women, so we exclude 
married women from our analysis.
8
The benefit calculations are made using the observed income information on each 
woman, along with information on the province of residence, year, and number of 
children.  Using a tax simulator, we calculate the child benefits owing to each woman 
under federal and provincial refundable tax credit programs.  We use the output of the 
simulator to form our main policy variable to measure the incentive to work, which we 
call INTEBENS.  This variable reflects the amount of child benefits that is integrated with 
social assistance; that crowd out social assistance payments.  The reaction of labour 
market decisions to this variable describes what would happen if a province were to make 
more (or less) benefits be subtracted from provincial social assistance. 
We form INTEBENS by first calculating the NCB Supplement payment owed to 
the family.  For the provinces that reduce social assistance by the amount of the NCB 
Supplement payments, INTEBENS equals the amount of NCB Supplement payment in 
the year.  For provinces that do not reduce SA payments, INTEBENS takes the value zero.  
For 1996 and 1997, there was no NCB Supplement benefit so the value of INTEBENS is 
zero in all provinces, with one exception explained below.  For 1998, the NCB 
Supplement began in July so we impute half the NCB Supplement value for that year to 
                                                 
7 Those under 18 are typically not eligible for social assistance.  Those over 50 have few children. 
8 Married women are much less likely to be on social assistance.  In our sample, 4.2 per cent of married 
women have some social assistance income compared to 16.5 per cent of single women.  Among women 
with children, 43.5 percent of single women are on social assistance while only 4.4 percent of married 
women are.  Moreover, the husband’s income pushes most married women over the income threshold 
($25,921 in 1998) at which all NCB Supplement benefits are gone.  In our simulated benefits, 74.7 percent 
of single mothers receive some NCB Supplement while only 17.8 percent of married mothers do.   
  12the INTEBENS variable.  Finally, in British Columbia, the BC Family Bonus was clawed 
back from social assistance cheques starting in July 1996, so INTEBENS incorporates 
both the BC Family Bonus and the NCB Supplement for British Columbia. 
  We form the instruments described earlier in the paper using the same tax 
simulator.  After putting our sample of families through the simulator, we select those 
who had positive employment earnings and take the average value of the benefit variables 
by province-year and by province-year-child cells.  For the province-year cells, we 
exclude families without children from the simulation sample.  For the province-year-
children cells, we assign each family in the simulation 0 through 3 children in turn, so 
that we can get a benefit measure for the same set of families for all family sizes.  The 
resulting benefits represent an exogenous measure of what benefits a working family 
could expect to receive given its province, year, and family size. 
  The outcomes we study in our analysis include four binary variables of labour 
market behaviour and five continuous measures of the intensity of work.  We have a 
binary variable for any receipt of social assistance and one for having any earnings.   
These dummies are relatively blunt tools, as even a small amount of income will turn the 
outcome variable to a one.  A more subtle measure is also provided in the SLID that 
indicates the ‘major’ source of income for the family.
9  We form a dummy for having 
government transfers as the major source of income, and a dummy for earnings as the 
major source of income.  The continuous measures include earnings, social assistance 
income, total income, hours worked, and weeks worked.  All of these are measured over 
the calendar year in question. 
                                                 
9 The major source of income variable is defined by the SLID.  Across several income categories (earned 
income, pensions, government transfers, etc.), the major source is defined as the category with the highest 
level of income. 
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sizes.  Except for earnings, all measures of labour supply decrease monotonically with the 
number of children, while the measures of social assistance increase monotonically with 
the number of children.  Single women with children are large recipients of social 
assistance.  More than half of single women with three or more children show some 
social assistance income, and 55.7 percent of them have transfers as the major source of 
income. Still, more than 63 percent of them have some earnings in the year.   
  Descriptive statistics for our independent variables are provided in Table 2.  The 
first column presents the means and standard deviations of many of our variables for the 
full sample of single women.  The next three columns present the same statistics for 
subsamples of interest – mothers of children, major transfer recipients and those who are 
not major transfer recipients.  The 34,018 women in the full sample receive, on average 
over all years, $87.65 of integrated NCB benefits (INTEBENS).  Looking just at mothers 
of children, the benefits are higher at $419.39.  The mean over observations with positive 
of  INTEBENS is $1,179.99.  For major transfer recipients, INTEBENS  is larger on 
average than for those who are not major transfer recipients. 
Over 16 percent of women have positive social assistance income, rising to over 43 
percent of single women with children.  Correspondingly, positive earnings is higher for 
the full sample of women than for the subsample of mothers, at 0.817 compared to 0.703.  
Looking in the last two columns, it is clear that those who have transfers as their major 
source of income work much less than those who do not.  The education levels of the 
different samples vary significantly.  Transfer recipients are much more likely to be high 
school dropouts, at 31.3 percent versus 11.1 percent for those who are not major transfer 
recipients.  Finally, major transfer recipients are more likely to have children, and those 
  14children are more likely to be young, than single women who are not major transfer 
recipients. 
Table 3 provides further detail on our policy variables.  We show the mean of four 
different policy variables for single mothers for each year and province in our sample.  
The upper left section of the table shows the values for INTEBENS.  Newfoundland, New 
Brunswick, and Quebec show zero in all years because these provinces do not reduce 
social assistance payments for child benefits received.  The British Columbia row shows 
the introduction of the BC Family Bonus half way through 1996 and for the full year in 
1997.  The provinces that integrated have the NCB Supplement introduced in July, 1998, 
and fully in place for 1999 and 2000.  The observed differences among provinces that are 
integrated reflect differences in characteristics such as income and number of children.  
Our IV strategy will discard these differences and focus on the policy variation.  The 
discussion of the other policy variables in Table 3 is deferred until Section 6 when the 
results for those variables are discussed. 
 
5. Main Results 
To begin our analysis of results, we present graphs of some of our labour market outcome 
variables through time.  We then report results for OLS regression that do not account for 
the mechanical endogeneity of benefits with work in order to motivate the need for our 
instrumental variables strategy.  Next, we present results for INTEBENS using our IV 
strategy based on province-year cells, followed by a similar strategy that allows for 
variation in the number of children.  Finally, we show the sensitivity of our results to 
several alternative sample selection criteria. 
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Figures 3 through 6 graph our binary outcomes variables for provinces who integrated 
social assistance and child benefits and for those who did not.  Because British Columbia 
effectively reduced social assistance for the entire period, it is omitted from these graphs 
to maintain clarity.  Figure 3 shows the proportion of women having positive social 
assistance income.  Before 1998, when there was no NCB Supplement, social assistance 
receipt was trending downward in both sets of provinces, possibly reflecting improving 
national labour market conditions.  After 1998, social assistance receipt in those 
provinces that reduced social assistance (referred to as integration provinces) drops below 
that seen in the no-integration provinces, consistent with people moving from welfare to 
work following the NCB Supplement incentives. 
Figure 4 repeats the analysis for the variable indicating positive earnings.  There is 
little difference to be seen between the two lines over time as both increase by more than 
15 percentage points over this time period.   In Figures 5 and 6, however, the results are 
much clearer.  Figure 5 has the graph for having government transfers as the major source 
of income.  There is a clear drop in the integration provinces from 45.5 percent in 1998 to 
31.7 percent in 2000.  The line for the no-integration provinces, however, is flat.  An 
equal and opposite reaction is seen for the variable indicating earnings as the major 
source of income.  From 1998 to 2000, there was an increase of over 12 percentage points 
in the crowd-out provinces and only 2 percentage points in the no-integration provinces. 
The graphical analysis has provided some preliminary visual indication that a sharp 
change in employment and social assistance receipt may have occurred after 1998 in the 
integration provinces, but not in the no-integration provinces.  The regression analysis in 
  16the rest of this section aims to uncover stronger more convincing evidence of what can be 




  Our main regression results are reported in Table 4.  We report the coefficient on 
INTEBENS, scaled in $1,000s of 2000 Canadian dollars.  This means that the estimated 
coefficient represents the predicted change in the outcome variable when $1,000 more 
child benefits becomes subject to the social assistance crowd out through the integration 
of benefits and social assistance.  All reported standard errors are corrected by clustering 
on the level of aggregation of the benefit variable, which in some cases is province-year 
cells and for others is province-year-children cells. 
The first column reports OLS regression results of the outcome variables on 
INTEBENS and the set of control variables for the sample of single mothers.  For each 
regression, we only report the coefficient on the benefit variable.  Since benefit levels 
first rise with earnings and then later fall for those with higher family income, the 
predicted sign for the estimated coefficients is unclear – those with zero benefits could be 
women who did not work at all or they could be women who earned very much and saw 
their benefits completely clawed back.  Correspondingly, the estimated coefficients are 
hard to interpret.  The estimated coefficient on social assistance receipt is 0.136, 
suggesting a 13.6 percentage point increase in receipt when benefits increase by $1,000.  
Having positive earnings, however, is predicted to decrease by 8.1 percentage points.  
High earning women have their benefits completely clawed back because of their higher 
family income, so high earners tend to have no benefits.  This mechanical endogeneity 
  17demonstrates the difficulties inherent in using observed in-work benefit amounts to study 




To correct for this endogeneity, we turn to our first set of IV estimates in the second 
column.  Here, we maintain our focus on women with children.  As an instrument for 
benefits, we use the simulated province-year cell mean of INTEBENS.  This measure of 
benefits throws away any individual variation in family size or income and picks up only 
across-province, across-time variation in benefit levels.  The first stage is a regression of 
INTEBENS on the province-year cell mean of simulated benefits. The first stage is very 
strong, with a $1 increase in the cell mean benefits predicted to increase individual 
imputed benefits by $0.916. 
The four measures of labour market participation all have the expected sign, and three 
are statistically significant.  A $1,000 increase in benefits leads to a 5.2 percentage point 
decrease in having positive social assistance income.  The mean social assistance receipt 
in this population is 43.5 percent, so the estimate implies an 11.9 percent decrease in 
social assistance receipt.  The variable indicating transfers as the major income source is 
more responsive, with an estimated coefficient of -0.092.  The binary measures of 
earnings have weaker results, with the indicator for positive earnings showing an 
insignificant coefficient.  However, the variable for having earnings as the major income 
source is highly responsive, with a predicted increase of 7.3 percentage points.  The mean 
of this variable in the sample of women with children is 0.502, so the estimate represents 
a 14.5 percent increase over the mean.  The stronger results for the ‘major source’ 
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attachment who move to have greater labour force attachment, rather than from women 
with precisely zero attachment joining the labour force. 
  To put these estimates in context, consider a woman with one child contemplating 
the welfare or work decision.  On welfare, assume that she would receive $850 per 
month, or $10,200 annually.  If she worked at an $8 per hour job for 40 hours per week 
for 52 weeks, she would earn $16,640; an increment of $6,440 over social assistance.  A 
thousand dollar increase in INTEBENS would imply that the increment to income from 
choosing work would increase by 15.5 percent to $7,440.  For the social assistance 
receipt variable therefore, the implied elasticity in this example is 0.77 (11.9 percent / 
15.5 percent).  In the US literature on the EITC, Hotz and Scholz (2003) conclude that the 
range of credibly estimated elasticities is between 0.69 and 1.16.  So, our first estimate 
lies comfortably in that range. 
  The continuous labour supply measures show a mixed response.  The point 
estimate on earnings is quite high – suggesting that earnings increase by $1,010.9 for a 
$1,000 increase in integrated benefits, although the standard error is quite large.  With the 
higher earned income, it is not surprising that total income is also predicted to be higher 
with more integration.  Finally, we estimate an increase in hours worked of 97.7 but no 
significant increase in weeks worked. 
For social assistance, the estimated effect of making another thousand dollars 
subject to integration is a decrease of $747.  This result is composed of two effects.  First, 
some families move from social assistance to work and therefore no longer collect any 
social assistance.  Second, for those who stay on social assistance, the dollar-for-dollar 
crowd-out of social assistance income also leads to a mechanical decrease in social 
  19assistance income when INTEBENS increases.  Because not all women in the sample are 
on social assistance, we shouldn’t expect the dollar-for-dollar crowd out to result in a 
coefficient of –1000.0. 
  In the third column we expand the sample to include single women without 
children.  We form the instrument for this sample by using the same province-year cells 
as before, but now include benefits at zero for the childless families.  These women serve 
as a control for unobserved factors in each province-year location such as labour market 
conditions or other labour market policies, as the childless single women live in the same 
province and act in the same labour markets but do not receive any benefits.  We include 
dummies for having no children, as well as second order interactions of having no 
children with province and year effects.  In such a specification, the policy effect is 
therefore identified by differences in labour supply between childless women and women 
with children in any given province-year combination.   
For the binary labour market indicators, the point estimates are uniformly larger when 
we include the childless women in column (3).  Welfare receipt is now predicted to 
decrease by 6.5 percentage points for a $1,000 increase in integrated benefits.  The 
positive earnings indicator is still not statistically significant, but the point estimate is 2.3 
percentage points larger than the previous specification. 
The continuous measures of labour supply again show less of a response than the 
binary indicators.  The estimated effect on earnings is now almost exactly zero.  This may 
indicate that the previous large positive estimate was simply picking up trends in earnings 
across provincial labour markets or some other unobserved factor.  Social assistance 
income is still strongly negative, with an estimated average crowd out of $825.2 for each 
  20$1,000 in integrated benefits.  We still find a positive impact on hours worked, with a 
predicted increase of 70.4 hours per year. 
Finally, in the fourth column of the table we use a more flexible instrument that 
allows for variation in the benefit corresponding to the number of children in the family.  
While this contributes more identifying variation, it could be argued that the variation is 
not exogenous; that the number of children might respond to the benefits incentive.  We 
examine this possibility later in this section.  The point estimates in this column are very 
similar to the previous specification, but more precisely measured.  The coefficient on the 
indicator for having positive earnings is now slightly stronger and reaches the 10 percent 
level of statistical significance. 
Using the estimated coefficient for social assistance receipt of -6.0 percentage points, 
we can assess the magnitude of the contribution of the NCB Supplement integration to 
the overall downward trend in social assistance receipt.  We take 1997 as the base year as 
it is the last full year before the NCB was introduced.
10  In provinces with crowd-out, 
social assistance take-up among single women declined from 48.7 percent to 35.4 percent 
in our sample between 1997 and 2000.  The average value for INTEBENS in integration 
provinces was $1097.55, compared to $290.6 in 1997, a difference of $806.95.
11  The 
coefficient of -6.0 per thousand dollars suggests that this increase in integrated benefits 
can account for a decline in social assistance receipt of 4.8 percentage points, which is 
36.5 percent of the total decline of social assistance receipt of 13.3 percentage points in 
the integration provinces over the 1997-2000 period.  So, our estimates suggest that the 
                                                 
10 The calculation produces a similar result using 1996 as the base year. 
11 Before 1998, residents of British Columbia were eligible for the BC Family Bonus which was subtracted 
from social assistance.  The value of INTEBENS in all other provinces was zero before 1998. 
  21integration of the NCB Supplement with provincial social assistance programs can 
account for about one third of the decline in social assistance receipt. 
 
Sample Sensitivity Checks 
 
To assess the sensitivity of our results to some of our assumptions, we present the 
results for alternative samples in Table 5.  For the results in column (2), we identify a 
population that we might expect to have a larger response and see if it is so.  Women with 
children under age six have much greater childcare demands than those of school-going 
age.  For this reason, the responsiveness of mothers with young children may be limited.  
Restricting the sample to women with children at least 6 years old also helps as a 
robustness check against the possibility that fertility may be endogenous.  Children aged 
six or more were born before the NCB policy was contemplated, so can be considered 
exogenous to the policy.  Compared to the base results, the restricted sample has much 
larger coefficients.  The coefficient on integrated benefits for the regression with positive 
social assistance income, for example, more than doubles to -0.130. 
In the third column, we try another restriction for a sample we think may be more 
responsive.  Most women over age 24 will have completed their education, while a large 
proportion of women in their late teens are still potentially in school.  By selecting a 
sample of women more active in the labour market, we expect to see a higher sensitivity 
to the incentives in the NCB.  We find point estimates that are statistically 
indistinguishable from the base case, although they are uniformly larger.  Taken together 
with the results in column 2, the results appear to vary sensibly in suitably chosen 
subsamples. 
  22  The final column of Table 5 shows the results excluding Quebec.  Because 
Quebec did not participate in the NCB (although Quebec residents still receive the NCB 
Supplement) and because Quebec’s policy environment differs in many other ways, we 
restrict our sample in column 4 to provinces other than Quebec.  The results suggest that 
the possibly confounding Quebec factors are not driving our results. 
 
6. Results including other policy variables 
Contemporaneous with the introduction of the NCB Supplement and the integration 
with social assistance payments, several provinces introduced new child benefit 
programs.  In addition, there were other changes at the federal benefit level over our 
sample period.  Finally, social assistance rates continued to evolve between 1996 and 
2000.  The impact of any of these policy changes on the labour market behaviour of 
single women is of interest on its own.  However, it is of particular interest here because 
other policy changes may be confounding our findings for the integration of social 
assistance payments through the NCB program.  In this section, we pursue analysis of all 
of the policy changes mentioned above. 
  The first additional policy variable we create is WORKBENS.  This variable 
records the benefits of earned income credits for those who work.  This includes the in-
work benefits available in some provinces as part of the provincial component of the 
NCB program as well as the federal Working Income Supplement and the small Goods 
and Services Tax Credit. (More information on these programs is available in the 
Appendix.)  We next compute a variable we call AUTOBENS.  This variable accounts for 
benefits that are paid ‘automatically’ to families without conditioning on earnings.   
Included in this measure are several provincial benefits and the federal Canada Child Tax 
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provinces that don’t integrate the NCB Supplement with social assistance benefits.
12  The 
final policy variable we form is PROVSA.  This variable measures the statutory level of 
social assistance benefits payable to the family if it were on social assistance.  We gather 
the data on provincial social assistance from the National Council on Welfare (2003).  
The available rates vary by province and by year, and as well between single families 
with no children and with children. 
  The province-year variation in these policy variables can be seen in Table 3.  For 
WORKBENS in 1996 and 1997, the federal Working Income Supplement was in effect.  
The amounts vary in the table by province because of differing income levels – our 
instrumental variables strategy removes this income variation leaving no identifying 
information from the Working Income Supplement since our year dummies will account 
for national variation.  For the last three years, residents of New Brunswick, Ontario, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia were eligible for earned income 
supplements.
13  For the automatic benefits, the policy variation comes from small 
provincial credits under the NCB program, as well as increased automatic benefits for the 
provinces that did not integrate NCB payments.  Finally, statutory social assistance 
payments changed little over this period, with the observed within-province variation 
reflecting differing price-indexation across provinces and differences in family 
composition across cells. 
In Table 6, we present evidence using the alternative benefit measures to gauge the 
importance of other provincially-varying benefits versus the NCB Supplement.  In all 
                                                 
12 Because British Columbia and Quebec reduce provincial child benefits when federal benefits increase, 
AUTOBENS does not increase when the NCB Supplement is introduced in these provinces. 
13 New Brunswick’s earned income credit was introduced in 1997, before the NCB.  Details on all 
programs are provided in the Appendix. 
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provincial variation.  For WORKBENS and AUTOBENS we use the same IV strategy as 
we used for INTEBENS to predict benefits, but for PROVSA we simply use the statutory 
benefit rates available to the family as the policy variable. 
The results in Table 6 use each of the policy variables in isolation, and then combine 
them together in the fifth column.  The first column uses INTEBENS and so reproduces 
the results from the previous table.  The second column uses WORKBENS.  Higher 
provincial in-work benefits provide an incentive to work very similar to the EITC.  The 
estimates are much less precise than for INTEBENS, meaning that it is difficult to find 
significant coefficients.  The signs and magnitudes are not dissimilar to those measured in 
Column 1, with the exception of transfer major source which is about half again as large 
and statistically significant. 
The third column uses the AUTOBENS variable.  Because more benefits not 
conditional on earnings decrease the incentive to work, we expect to find opposite signs 
than we found for the first two columns.  The results do show the expected sign pattern, 
with both of the ‘major source’ variables showing strongly significant coefficients. 
The effect of provincial social assistance rates is estimated to be strong and positive 
for having any social assistance income.  However, the other three point estimates are 
uniformly close to zero, although imprecisely estimated.  The lack of strong variation in 
provincial social assistance rates over this period may contribute to these inconclusive 
findings. 
The final column puts all four policy variables in the same regression.  For all four 
dependent variables, the point estimate and significance level for INTEBENS is stronger 
in column (4) than in column (1), suggesting that other provincial programs omitted from 
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WORKBENS and PROVSA are positive for having any social assistance income, but 
insignificant for the other three dependent variables. 
From this evidence we draw two conclusions; one strong and one more tentative.  The 
stronger conclusion is that our main results on the impact of the integration of NCB 
benefits with social assistance are not driven by these other policies.  The more tentative 
conclusion is that integration is a more effective policy than earned income credits or 
lower social assistance payments in increasing work among single females.  The point 
estimates are almost all larger for the integration policy, but the imprecision of the earned 
income supplement estimates renders this conclusion more speculative. 
  One potential explanation for the stronger effect of integration compared to 
earned income credits is that the NCB Supplement is directly subtracted from the 
recipients’ monthly social assistance cheques. Recipients are therefore made well aware 
that they must work to receive additional benefits. On the other hand, the provincial 
programs are often administered separately, or through tax returns.  While the incentive 
structure may be similar, recipients may not be as aware of potential work incentives and 
crowd-out effects.  Previous work has documented the relationship between take-up and 
the visibility of the program (Currie, 2004). In our case individuals need not apply 
separately for the federal and provincial programs, and as such differential take-up is not 
driving differences here. However, the transparency of the mechanisms by which the 
programs promote workforce participation does differ and transparency arguments may 
indeed explain part of the differential effects on labour supply. However, we can not 
directly test this explanation. 
 
  267. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the introduction of the National Child Benefit program in 
Canada in 1998.  Because some provinces chose to integrate the benefits with their social 
assistance programs and some did not, cross-province variation in the incentives to leave 
social assistance were introduced.  We exploit these differences and find a large, 
statistically and economically significant effect on social assistance take-up and work.  
The magnitudes of the effects we estimate are within the range of those found in the 
EITC literature in the United States.  Our estimates suggest that about one third of the 
total decline in social assistance receipt can be accounted for by the integration of social 
assistance payments. We find that the federal National Child Benefit program has much 
stronger effects on work than do the provincial earned income credit programs that were 
also designed to promote labour force participation, although the latter effects were 
imprecisely estimated. We speculate that a possible reason for these differences in 
efficacy lie in the relative transparency of the relationship between the benefit and labour 
force participation.  
Saez (2002) stresses the importance of differentiating between the extensive and the 
intensive elasticities when evaluating labour market incentives.  His optimal tax model 
recommends a benefit with a smaller transfer and an earnings exemption before receiving 
any benefit when the extensive elasticity is large, and a benefit with larger transfers and 
clawbacks starting at very low incomes when the extensive elasticity is less responsive.  
In the context of this model, the large extensive elasticities that we estimate may provide 
some justification for the integration of benefits under the NCB, as the integration 
effectively acts as an earnings exemption, with benefits received only by those who are 
working. 
  27Appendix – Details on Child Benefits 
 
Below we provide details on the federal and provincial child benefits we include in our 
tax calculator.  The discussion is split between the in-work benefits and the automatic 
benefits.  Unless otherwise stated, the description applies to the year 2000.  In all cases, 
the family income measured used to claw back benefits is from line 236 of the federal tax 




In-work benefits condition on having some employment income. 
 
Federal Goods and Services Tax Supplement:  1991 
 
A credit of $106 is phased in at a rate of 2 percent for income over $6,546.  Only 
childless single adults are eligible.  It is clawed back along with the Goods and Services 
Tax Credit at a rate of 5 percent for income over $26,284. 
 
Federal Working Income Supplement:  1993 
 
This credit paid benefits of $500 until 1996 and $605, $405, and $330 for one, two and 
three children in 1997.  It was phased in at a rate of 8 per cent for income higher than 
$3,750, and clawed back at a rate of 10 percent for family income over $20,921.  It was 
cancelled in 1998. 
 
New Brunswick Working Income Supplement:  1997 
 
For each dollar of earned income over $3,750, a family with children receives 4 cents 
more Working Income Supplement up to a maximum of $250.  Family income over 
$20,921 reduces the Supplement by 5 cents until it is completely clawed back. 
 
Ontario Child Care Supplement for Working Families: 1998 
 
Benefits increase with earned income over $5,000 by 21 cents per dollar for one child 
under age 7, 42 cents for two children under 7, and 63 cents for three or more children 
under 7.  The maximum benefit is $1,100 for single families and $1,310 for married 
families.  For income greater than $20,000, the benefit is decreased by 8 cents per dollar 
of family income. 
 
Saskatchewan Employment Supplement: 1998 
 
The benefit is zero until $1,500 of earned income.  For earnings greater than $1,500, the 
benefits are increased by 25 to 45 cents per dollar, depending on the number of children.  
The maximum benefit is $2,100 for the first child, plus $420 for each additional child.  
The clawback threshold is $12,900 and the clawback rate is 25 cents per dollar of 
earnings over the threshold. 
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Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit:  1998 
 
The benefit pays up to $500 to families with one child and up to $1000 for families with 
two children.  The benefit starts when earned income reaches $6,500 and rise by 8 cents 
per dollar of income over the threshold.  They begin to be clawed back at $25,000 at a 
rate of 4 cents per dollar. 
 
British Columbia Earned Income Benefit:  1998 
 
The benefit pays up to $605 for the first child, $405 for the second, and $330 for the third 
and fourth child.  The benefit is clawed in between $3,750 and $10,000 at the rate 
necessary to ensure the maximum benefit is reached at $10,000.  The benefit is clawed 
back for earnings over $20,921 at 12.1% for one child, 20.2% for two children, and 




Automatic benefits do not condition on having employment income.  They are transferred 
to eligible families even if they have zero earned income. 
 
Federal Goods and Services Tax Credit 
 
The benefit pays $202 per adult and $106 per child.  It is clawed back with family income 
at a rate of 5 percent in excess of $26,284. 
 
Federal Canada Child Tax Benefit 
 
The benefit pays up to $1,104 per child.  It is clawed back with family income at a rate of 
2.5 percent for one child and 5 percent for two or more children for family income in 
excess of $26,284. 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador Child Benefit: 1999 
 
The benefit pays $204 for one child, an additional $312 for a second child, $336 for the 
third child, and $360 for a fourth or subsequent child.  It is clawed back on family income 
in excess of $15,921 until the income level of $20,921 when it is exhausted. 
 
Nova Scotia Child Benefit:  1998 
 
The benefit pays $403 for one child, an additional $319 for a second child, and $286 for a 
third or subsequent child.  It is clawed back with family income in excess of $16,000 
until the income level of $20,921 when it is exhausted. 
 
New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit: 1997 
 
  29The benefit pays $250 per child.  It is clawed back at a rate of 2.5 percent for one child or 
5 percent for two or more children for family incomes in excess of $20,000. 
 
Quebec Family Allowance:  1998 
 
The benefit pays $625 per child, with an extra $1,300 for the first child of a single-parent 
family.  It is clawed back with family income in two tiers.  First, at a rate of 25 percent 
(35% for singles with one child) until a minimum benefit level is reached.  Following 
that, it is clawed back at a rate of 5 percent for incomes higher than $50,000.  Increases in 
federal child benefits result in corresponding decreases in the Quebec Family Allowance. 
 
Saskatchewan Child Benefit:  1998 
 
The benefit pays $720 for one child, an additional $924 for a second child, and $996 for a 
third or subsequent child.  It is clawed back with family income in excess of $15,921 at 
rates between 15 percent and 60.6 percent, depending on the number of children. 
 
British Columbia Family Bonus:  1996 
 
This benefit is integrated with the National Child Benefit Supplement.  Each child entitles 
the parent to $1,332 per year, from which the National Child Benefit Supplement amount 
is subtracted.  This benefit is also integrated with provincial social assistance as social 
assistance payments are reduced dollar for dollar with the Family Bonus.  The Bonus is 
clawed back on family income in excess of $18,000 at a rate of 8 percent for families 
with one child and 16 percent for families with two or more children. 
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  35Table 1:  Dependent Variables By Number of Children 
All
single Zero One Two Three
women children child children children
observations 34018 25994 4447 2682 895
Positive social assistance 0.165 0.094 0.403 0.460 0.520
Transfers major source 0.200 0.138 0.384 0.471 0.557
Positive earnings 0.817 0.847 0.737 0.670 0.635
Earnings major source 0.716 0.772 0.560 0.452 0.364
Weeks worked 35.8 36.8 34.1 30.8 26.3
(21.9) (21.3) (23.4) (24.2) (24.4)
Hours worked 1139.2 1158.7 1137.1 1018.4 853.6
(900.4) (887.3) (944.7) (941.1) (914.7)
Earnings 16396.4 16546.6 17088.2 14775.7 12803.0
(18629.7) (18818.4) (18259.0) (17248.7) (17358.7)
Social assistance 1196.1 587.9 2905.0 3927.9 5113.2
(3173.1) (2163.2) (4329.9) (5080.2) (6111.1)
Total income 19972.6 18511.8 24579.0 26187.1 27964.4
(18290.0) (18673.5) (16021.7) (15165.9) (14042.0)
Notes:  All dollar values in 2000 Canadian dollars.  Standard deviations are beneath continuous variables.
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All Single Major Not  major
single women with transfer transfer
women children recipients recipients
observations 34018 8024 7272 26746
INTEBENS 87.65 419.39 255.45 45.79
(394.4) (777.9) (675.5) (267.9)
Positive social assistance 0.165 0.435 0.683 0.036
Positive earnings 0.817 0.703 0.279 0.951
Age 30.0 35.6 32.2 29.5
(9.7) (7.6) (9.4) (9.7)
Education - dropout 0.151 0.200 0.313 0.111
Education - secondary graduate 0.134 0.159 0.148 0.131
Education - some post secondary 0.564 0.552 0.494 0.582
Education - university graduate 0.151 0.089 0.045 0.177
Number of children 0.332 1.589 0.770 0.223
Child under age 6 0.074 0.352 0.218 0.037
Notes:  All dollar values in 2000 Canadian dollars.  Standard deviations are beneath
continuous variables.  
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Average value of INTEBENS among single mothers Average value of WORKBENS among single mothers
N e w f o u n d l a n d 00000 N e w f o u n d l a n d 6 7 8 8 000
Prince Edward Island 0 0 313 882 1137 Prince Edward Island 180 227 0 0 0
Nova Scotia 0 0 397 992 1183 Nova Scotia 114 107 0 0 0
N e w  B r u n s w i c k 00000 N e w  B r u n s w i c k 9 7 1 9 8 7 4 6 3 8 6
Q u e b e c 00000 Q u e b e c 9 5 1 6 5 000
Ontario 0 0 304 797 945 Ontario 80 139 164 250 241
Manitoba 0 0 346 1027 1112 Manitoba 162 226 0 0 0
Saskatchewan 0 0 378 1040 1226 Saskatchewan 175 269 788 802 703
Alberta 0 0 289 695 862 Alberta 193 257 278 337 243
British Columbia 849 1653 1540 1700 1619 British Columbia 124 151 238 297 240
Average value of AUTOBENS among single mothers Average value of PROVSA among single mothers
Newfoundland 1900 1912 2560 2938 3678 Newfoundland 11271 11373 11449 11508 11607
Prince Edward Island 1896 2032 2291 2072 2117 Prince Edward Island 10250 9984 9680 9282 9599
Nova Scotia 2214 2222 2842 2508 2663 Nova Scotia 10568 10571 10394 10158 10047
New Brunswick 1946 2170 2771 2992 3382 New Brunswick 9580 9851 9934 9930 9926
Quebec 2280 2190 4177 4323 4459 Quebec 11537 11104 10835 10547 10295
Ontario 2067 1962 2278 2002 2063 Ontario 11949 11976 11670 11277 11097
Manitoba 1902 2021 2335 2433 2246 Manitoba 9644 9647 9344 8946 8975
Saskatchewan 2234 2267 3351 3155 3110 Saskatchewan 10389 10393 9298 9488 9458
Alberta 2139 2086 2281 1954 1954 Alberta 9198 9278 9194 9084 8972
British Columbia 2975 2149 2054 2078 2210 British Columbia 11973 11928 11624 11237 11161
 
Table 3:  Policy Variation By Year and Province 
 Table 4:  Main Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
sample single single all single all single
mothers mothers women women
Instrument variation -- Prov-year Prov-year- Prov-year-
has children number children
observations 8024 8024 34018 34018
First stage -- 0.916 *** 0.906 *** 0.915 ***
(0.026) (0.014) (0.011)
Positive SA 0.136 *** -0.052 ** -0.065 ** -0.060 ***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.026) (0.016)
Transfers major source 0.158 *** -0.092 *** -0.106 *** -0.113 ***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018)
Positive earnings -0.081 *** 0.007 0.030 0.039 *
(0.013) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020)
Earnings major source -0.193 *** 0.073 *** 0.074 *** 0.079 ***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016)
Earnings -10035.5 *** 1010.9 * -4.1 570.0
(627.0) (555.5) (503.7) (529.3)
Social assistance 1040.6 *** -746.9 ** -825.2 *** -886.3 ***
(136.4) (292.8) (289.8) (206.2)
Total Income -7610.4 *** 1087.1 ** -844.5 -389.9
(571.0) (419.7) (605.6) (405.7)
Weeks worked -6.5 *** 1.3 1.2 1.2
(0.7) (1.0) (0.8) (0.9)
Hours worked -290.7 *** 97.7 *** 70.4 *** 86.2 **
(27.8) (34.6) (26.0) (33.8)
Notes:  Reported is the coefficient on INTEBENS scaled in thousands of 2000 Canadian dollars.  One, 
two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
All specifications include dummies foryear, province, number of children, age of woman, education
 level, and presence of a child under age 6.  In the third column there are second-order interactions
 betweeen province, year, and presence of children dummies.  In the fourth column there are second-
order interactions between province, year, and number of children dummies.
 
  39Table 5:  Sensitivity Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclude
mothers Just 
Base of children women over Exclude
results under 6 age 24 Quebec
observations 34018 31314 19280 27553
First stage 0.915 *** 0.853 *** 0.895 *** 0.882 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
Positive social assistance -0.060 *** -0.130 *** -0.062 *** -0.101 ***
(0.016) (0.029) (0.016) (0.023)
Transfers major source -0.113 *** -0.150 *** -0.131 *** -0.111 ***
(0.018) (0.038) (0.022) (0.032)
Positive earnings 0.039 * 0.080 ** 0.054 *** 0.027
(0.020) (0.036) (0.020) (0.022)
Earnings major source 0.079 *** 0.112 *** 0.093 *** 0.078 ***
(0.016) (0.040) (0.020) (0.030)
Notes:  Reported is the coefficient on INTEBENS reported in thousands of 2000 Canadian dollars. One,
two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.  
All specifications include dummies foryear, province, number of children, age of woman, education   
 level,and presence of a child under age 6. There are second-order interactions betweeen province, year,
 and family size dummies.
 
  40Table 6:  Regressions Including Other Benefits 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INTEBENS WORKBENS AUTOBENS PROVSA ALL
observations 34018 34018 34018 34018 34018
Positive social assistance
INTEBENS -0.060 *** -- -- -- -0.088 ***
(0.016) (0.020)
WORKBENS -- -0.037 -- -- 0.158 **
(0.057) (0.074)
AUTOBENS -- -- 0.012 -- 0.005
(0.008) (0.010)
PROVSA -- -- -- 0.041 *** 0.066 ***
(0.014) (0.015)
Transfers major source
INTEBENS -0.113 *** -- -- -- -0.113 ***
(0.018) (0.030)
WORKBENS -- -0.164 ** -- -- 0.041
(0.064) (0.086)
AUTOBENS -- -- 0.036 *** -- 0.005
(0.009) (0.016)
PROVSA -- -- -- -0.008 0.014
(0.018) (0.018)
Earnings positive
INTEBENS 0.039 * -- -- -- 0.040
(0.020) (0.026)
WORKBENS -- 0.037 -- -- -0.060
(0.065) (0.104)
AUTOBENS -- -- -0.012 -- -0.006
(0.010) (0.018)
PROVSA -- -- -- -0.011 -0.012
(0.010) (0.020)
Earnings major source
INTEBENS 0.079 *** -- -- -- 0.088 ***
(0.016) (0.032)
WORKBENS -- 0.068 -- -- -0.117
(0.052) (0.075)
AUTOBENS -- -- -0.024 *** -- -0.009
(0.006) (0.013)
PROVSA -- -- -- 0.004 -0.020
(0.013) (0.014)
Notes:  Reported are the coefficients on the noted policy variables, scaled in thousands of 2000 Canadian dollars.
One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  The
control variables are the same as in Table 4, column 4.  INTEBENS, WORKBENS, and AUTOBENS are
instrumented using the corresponding policy instrument.
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